Famines & Famine Policy in Colonial India

§1 — Major Colonial Famines: Quick Reference

Major Colonial Famines: Quick Reference

Total estimated famine deaths in British India 1765-1943: over 60 million (some scholarly estimates).

§2 — Bengal Famine 1770

Bengal Famine 1770 (Chhiyattorer Manvantar)

The first major famine under EIC rule. Affected Bengal, Bihar, and Odisha (the new Diwani territories under Treaty of Allahabad 1765). Called "Chhiyattorer Manvantar" in Bengali — "the famine of 1176 BS" (Bengali year).

Causes

• Drought 1768-69; failed monsoon.
• Continued tax extraction by the EIC throughout the famine — actually increased revenue collection by 10% in 1770.
• Speculation by Company officials in grain — buying low, selling high during the crisis.
• Dual Government (1765-72) — divided responsibility; neither the Nawab nor the Company took ownership of crisis management.
• Hoarding by traders.

Mortality & Effects

• About 10 million dead — one-third of Bengal's population of 30 million.
• Vast tracts of land deserted; agriculture disrupted for a decade.
• Significant decline in Bengal's economic output.

Aftermath

The famine's catastrophic mismanagement was a major factor in:

• Warren Hastings's abolition of Dual Government in 1772.
• Regulating Act 1773 (UK Parliament).
• Permanent Settlement 1793 (Cornwallis hoped fixed revenue would force zamindars to manage estates).

§3 — Mid-19th Century Famines

Mid-19th Century Famines

NWP/Punjab Famine 1860-61

Affected NWP and Punjab; about 2 million deaths. Caused by failed monsoon. Under Lord Canning, the British government experimented with relief works — partial success. Set the template for later colonial relief.

Odisha Famine 1865-67

The famine in Odisha (then under Bengal Presidency) killed about 1 million people — one-third of Odisha's population. The famine devastated Odisha because it was geographically isolated (no railway connection until 1900), and the Bengal Government failed to act in time. Sir Cecil Beadon, Lt. Governor of Bengal, was widely criticised. The episode prompted the establishment of the first Famine Inquiry Committee in 1866.

Bihar Famine 1873-74

The Bihar Famine of 1873-74 saw the most successful colonial famine relief — under Lt. Governor Sir Richard Temple. Massive grain imports from Burma (₹40 million spent) and large-scale relief works limited deaths to a few thousand. However, the British Government criticised Temple for "extravagance"; this set the stage for tightening relief policy in subsequent famines.

§4 — The Great Famine 1876-78

The Great Famine 1876-78 (Madras Famine)

Affected Areas

• Madras Presidency (worst affected — Tamil districts, Andhra).
• Bombay Deccan.
• Princely States of Mysore, Hyderabad.
• Parts of Punjab, NWP.
• Total affected population: about 60-100 million.

Causes

• El Niño 1876-77 — failed monsoons two consecutive years.
• Continued grain export from India even during famine — over 6 million tons of wheat exported to Britain in famine years.
• Lytton's policy — Viceroy prioritised the 1877 Delhi Durbar (proclaiming Victoria as "Empress of India") over famine relief.
• "Famine Insurance Fund" set up in 1878 but tightly limited relief expenditure.

Lytton's Punitive Relief Policy

Building on Sir Richard Temple's "lessons" from Bihar 1873-74 (criticised for "extravagance"), Lytton applied a notorious policy:

• Relief work wages set at "Temple Wage" — about 1 lb of grain per day for hard physical labour. The wage was later shown to be below the calorie requirement for survival.
• "Distance test" — relief seekers had to walk long distances to reach relief camps; the weakest could not.
• Only able-bodied adults given relief work; women and children largely excluded.
• "Free market" doctrine — government refused to control grain prices or restrict exports.

Mortality

• British official figures: 5.5 million.
• Indian and revisionist estimates: 8.2-11 million.
• Madras Presidency alone: about 4 million dead.

Public Outrage

The combination of mass famine deaths and the lavish 1877 Delhi Durbar (cost £100,000+) generated outrage:

• Indian Civil Service officers like William Wedderburn resigned or wrote critically.
• The contrast became a foundational nationalist grievance.
• Dadabhai Naoroji's "Drain Theory" cited the famine as evidence of British exploitation.

§5 — Famine Commissions

Famine Commissions

Famine Commission of 1866 (Campbell Commission)

First Famine Commission, established after Odisha Famine. Chair: Sir George Campbell. Recommended better preparation, transport infrastructure, relief works.

Famine Commission of 1880 (Strachey Commission)

The most influential. Established after Great Famine 1876-78. Chair: Sir Richard Strachey. Recommendations:

• Famine Code for each province — codifying how government should respond to famine.
• Famine Insurance Fund — set aside ₹1.5 crore annually from revenue for famine relief.
• Mass employment relief works (e.g., road, irrigation) — but with strict wage controls.
• Regular reporting and inspection of vulnerable areas.
• Encouragement of agricultural diversification, irrigation works.

The Strachey Commission's recommendations led to the first Indian Famine Code (1883) and provincial codes thereafter.

Famine Commission of 1898 (Lyall Commission)

Established after the 1896-97 famine. Chair: Sir James Lyall. Reviewed the working of Famine Codes; recommended improvements in transport, irrigation, relief works.

Famine Commission of 1901 (MacDonnell Commission)

The most comprehensive Famine Commission. Established after the 1899-1900 famine. Chair: Sir Antony MacDonnell. Reports submitted 1901. Major recommendations:

• "Moral strategy" — preventing famine through better agriculture and rural development.
• Irrigation expansion — comprehensive plans (led to the Indian Irrigation Commission 1901-03 under Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff).
• Improved Famine Codes.
• Agricultural Banks — for cooperative credit (Cooperative Credit Societies Act 1904).
• Railway expansion for grain movement.
• Sanitary and public health measures.

The MacDonnell Commission marked a shift towards preventive rather than purely curative famine policy. However, implementation was uneven — and famines recurred.

§6 — Famine Codes

Famine Codes

Building on the Strachey Commission, each province developed its own Famine Code — administrative manuals for famine response:

• Madras Famine Code (1883).
• Bombay Famine Code.
• NWP Famine Code.
• Bengal Famine Code (revised 1897).

Standard Code Features

• Stages of relief: scarcity → famine declaration → relief works → gratuitous relief.
• Wage labour relief: able-bodied required to work on public projects.
• Gratuitous relief (gratuitous = free): for the elderly, disabled, mothers with infants.
• Suspension of land revenue in famine areas.
• Loans to cultivators (Taqavi loans).
• Coordination between districts.

Limitations

• Wage rates often below survival need.
• Distance tests excluded the weakest.
• Free trade ideology limited grain price control.
• Relief usually came too late — after starvation deaths.
• Famine Insurance Fund regularly diverted to other purposes.

Compared to pre-British famine policy (Mughal/Maratha/regional rulers' direct grain distribution and tax suspension), British policy was often technically more elaborate but morally more constrained by ideology and distant decision-making.

§7 — Late 19th & Early 20th Century Famines

Late 19th & Early 20th Century Famines

1896-97 Famine

Affected Madras, Bombay, NWP, Central Provinces, Bengal. About 5 million deaths. Lord Elgin II was Viceroy. The relief response was relatively better than 1876-78 due to Strachey-era Famine Codes, but still inadequate. The famine was followed by a major plague epidemic (Bombay 1896 onwards, Pune 1897 — leading to the Chapekar Brothers' assassination of Plague Commissioner W.C. Rand).

1899-1900 Famine

Affected Bombay Deccan, Hyderabad, Rajputana, Central India, Punjab. Deaths estimated 1-9 million (range due to dispute). Lord Curzon's response was more vigorous, but his subsequent prioritisation of the 1903 Delhi Durbar (£300,000+ spent) again drew criticism. The MacDonnell Commission (1901) followed.

Famine Frequency Decline (1900-1942)

Between 1900 and 1942, famine frequency declined significantly compared to the 1860-1900 period — due to:

• Railway expansion (allowing grain transport).
• Irrigation expansion (Indian Irrigation Commission 1901-03; canal works in Punjab, UP).
• Improved famine codes and earlier intervention.
• Reduced reliance on rain-fed agriculture in some areas.

However, regional crises (Bombay Deccan 1905-06, food shortages of 1918-19) continued.

§8 — Bengal Famine 1943

The Bengal Famine of 1943

The most studied 20th-century famine in India. Estimated 3 million dead (some estimates as high as 4 million).

Background

Bengal in 1942-43 faced multiple crises:

• Loss of Burmese rice imports — Japan occupied Burma March 1942; Burma had supplied 15-20% of Bengal's rice.
• Cyclone of October 1942 — devastated Midnapore, 24 Parganas; killed 14,500 directly; destroyed harvest of about 0.5 million tons.
• "Denial Policy" — British military destroyed boats and rice in coastal Bengal districts (esp. Midnapore) to prevent Japanese capture.
• Inflation from war spending — rice prices rose 300%+.
• Hoarding and speculation by traders.
• Quit India Movement (August 1942) — government repression diverted attention from food crisis.
• British war priorities — Churchill's policy diverted grain from India to Britain and the Mediterranean theatre.

Government Response

Initially, the Bengal provincial government (under Premier A.K. Fazlul Huq, then Khwaja Nazimuddin) denied the famine. Viceroy Lord Linlithgow was indifferent. Only after Lord Wavell succeeded as Viceroy (October 1943) was urgent action taken — but by then mass deaths had already occurred.

Mortality

• 3 million dead (Famine Inquiry Commission 1944, headed by Sir John Woodhead).
• Mostly from destitute classes — landless labourers, fishermen, artisans.
• Worst affected districts: Midnapore, Bankura, Tipperah, Faridpur.

Historiography

Amartya Sen's "Entitlement" Theory

Amartya Sen in "Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation" (1981, basis of his 1998 Nobel Prize) argued:

• The 1943 famine was NOT primarily a food production failure — Bengal's 1943 rice production was 5% below 1942 but actually higher than 1941.
• It was an "entitlement failure" — the poor lost their ability to command food due to wartime price inflation.
• Landless labourers, fishermen, artisans had cash incomes that didn't keep up with rice prices.
• The famine was a distribution failure, not a supply failure.

Madhusree Mukerjee's Critique of Churchill

Madhusree Mukerjee in "Churchill's Secret War" (2010) argued:

• Churchill personally diverted grain shipments away from Bengal during the famine.
• Churchill's anti-Indian (and arguably racist) attitudes — quoted as saying Indians were "a beastly people with a beastly religion" — informed his decisions.
• Australian wheat ships diverted from Calcutta to Mediterranean and British home stocks.
• Churchill's policies amounted to deliberate engineered famine.

Other historians (Cormac O Grada) accept Sen's entitlement framework but resist the strongest Churchill-blame thesis. The debate continues.

Famine Inquiry Commission 1944 (Woodhead Commission)

Reported in 1945. Found:

• Death toll about 1.5 million (later revised upward to 3 million).
• Cyclone, denial policy, inflation, hoarding all contributing factors.
• Recommended food rationing system (later adopted).
• Recommended permanent provincial Food Departments.

Aftermath

The Bengal Famine 1943 was the last major famine on the Indian subcontinent under colonial rule. Public outrage, Quit India aftermath, and ultimately Independence followed. Note: post-1947 India has never had a comparable mass-mortality famine — though droughts (1965-67, 1972-73) caused major crises that were managed without catastrophic death.

§9 — Why Did Famines Occur?

Why Did Famines Occur Under Colonial Rule?

Multiple converging causes:

Natural Factors

• Failed monsoons — El Niño cycles particularly 1876-77, 1896-97, 1899-1900.
• Floods, cyclones (Bengal 1942).
• Plant diseases.

Colonial Policy Factors

• Land revenue rigidity — taxes collected even during famines (vs Mughal flexibility).
• Free-market ideology — refused to control grain prices, restrict exports.
• Grain export from India even during famines (1876-78, 1943).
• Drain of wealth reduced India's capacity to invest in agriculture.
• De-industrialisation — destroyed alternative employment for surplus rural population.
• Inadequate irrigation investment compared to revenue extraction.
• Limited transport infrastructure (early period).
• Stunted Indian industry — couldn't absorb landless agricultural labour.

Demographic and Social Factors

• Rapid population growth from 1850 onwards (without proportionate productivity growth).
• Increasing landlessness.
• Caste/class barriers to mobility.
• Vulnerability of specific groups — landless labourers, weavers, artisans, fishermen.

Mike Davis's "Late Victorian Holocausts"

Historian Mike Davis in "Late Victorian Holocausts" (2001) argued that the 1876-78 and 1896-1902 famines killed 30-60 million across India, China, and Brazil — and these deaths were not natural disasters but the product of imperial integration into the world capitalist economy. Davis's thesis: famines are made by political choices, not natural cycles.

§10 — FAQs

FAQs