The 1st Amendment to the Indian Constitution was passed within a year of the document coming into force. The Constituent Assembly itself, sitting as the provisional Parliament, enacted it in June 1951. The amendment was a direct response to High Court decisions striking down State land-reform laws. It introduced three major changes that have shaped Indian constitutional law ever since: Article 31A (immunity for land-reform laws from challenge under Articles 14, 19, and 31), Article 31B (immunity for laws listed in the new Ninth Schedule), and the Ninth Schedule itself. The 2023 Prelims asked which amendment was widely believed to overcome judicial interpretations — the answer was the 1st. The 2018 Prelims asked about the Ninth Schedule's judicial-review immunity. Hold this amendment carefully.
The political context — land reform vs the courts
The Constitution as enacted in 1950 contained a Fundamental Right to property in Article 31. The article required compensation for compulsory acquisition of property and was framed strongly enough to give substantial protection to property holders.
The newly independent Indian States had immediately begun the process of zamindari abolition — the dismantling of the colonial-era system of intermediary land holdings. Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and other States enacted comprehensive land-reform legislation in 1949-50. The legislation transferred ownership of agricultural land from zamindars (intermediaries) to actual cultivators, with compensation paid by the State to the displaced zamindars.
The zamindars challenged these laws in High Courts. The Patna High Court struck down the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 in Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar (1951) on the ground that the compensation scheme violated Article 14 — different categories of zamindars were treated differently in the compensation formula. Other High Courts upheld similar laws. Before the Supreme Court could give a definitive ruling, the Nehru government chose to amend the Constitution itself — taking the question out of the courts' hands.
The 1st Amendment Bill was introduced in May 1951 and enacted in June 1951. It was passed by the provisional Parliament — the Constituent Assembly continuing as the provisional Parliament until elections were held in 1951-52. Nehru argued that the amendment was needed to preserve the social-reform agenda; critics argued that the amendment was a circumvention of judicial review on a question that should have been left to the courts.
The three major changes — 31A, 31B, Ninth Schedule
Article 31A — was inserted to protect land-reform laws from challenge under Articles 14, 19, and 31. The article specifically immunised laws providing for the acquisition of "estates" (zamindari and similar tenures) and the extinguishment of rights in such estates. The original Article 31A protected only land-reform laws of a specific kind. It was later expanded by the 4th Amendment (1955) and the 17th Amendment (1964) to cover ryotwari lands and other categories of land-reform legislation.
Article 31B — was inserted to give blanket immunity to laws specifically listed in the Ninth Schedule. Any law placed in the Ninth Schedule was immune from challenge on the ground that it violated any Fundamental Right. Article 31B was therefore broader than Article 31A — Article 31A protected a category of laws (those acquiring estates); Article 31B protected specific named laws regardless of their subject matter.
The Ninth Schedule — was added to the Constitution as a new schedule. Initially, only thirteen State Acts (zamindari-abolition laws) were listed in it. The Schedule has since been expanded by successive amendments to include over 280 laws — covering not just land reform but a wide range of social and economic legislation.
The Ninth Schedule was an innovation in constitutional design. Most constitutions allow legislation to be tested against constitutional provisions; the Ninth Schedule created a category of legislation that was immune from such testing. The mechanism allowed legislatures to insulate any law from Fundamental Rights challenge simply by placing it in the Schedule.
The 2018 Prelims — Ninth Schedule judicial review
The 2018 Prelims tested whether laws in the Ninth Schedule are immune from judicial review.
- The Parliament of India can place a particular law in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India.
- The validity of a law placed in the Ninth Schedule cannot be examined by any court and no judgement can be made on it.
The 2018 PYQ tests the post-Coelho position. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007), a 9-judge bench, held that the Ninth Schedule's immunity from Fundamental Rights challenge is not absolute. Laws placed in the Schedule after the date of Kesavananda Bharati (24 April 1973) can be challenged on the ground that they damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. The basic-structure limit applies to Ninth Schedule entries as it does to ordinary constitutional amendments.
So the modern position on Ninth Schedule immunity is layered. Pre-Kesavananda entries (placed before 24 April 1973) retain blanket immunity from Fundamental Rights challenge. Post-Kesavananda entries can be challenged on basic-structure grounds. This is the Coelho gloss on the original 1st Amendment scheme.
The 2023 Prelims — overcoming judicial interpretations
The 2023 Prelims asked which amendment was enacted to overcome judicial interpretations of Fundamental Rights.
The 2023 trap is options (b) and (c). The 42nd Amendment was enacted during the Emergency to make sweeping ideological changes; while it did try to limit judicial review, its primary purpose was not narrowly to overcome specific judicial interpretations. The 44th Amendment was enacted by the Janata government to undo the 42nd Amendment's distortions — it was responsive to the political climate, not to specific judicial interpretations. The 1st Amendment, by contrast, was directly aimed at specific High Court decisions on land reform.
Other 1st Amendment changes — Article 19, Articles 85, 87
Beyond the property-related changes, the 1st Amendment made several other substantive amendments.
Article 19 modified. The 1st Amendment changed the grounds on which "reasonable restrictions" could be imposed on the freedoms in Article 19. Article 19(2) was modified to allow restrictions on freedom of speech in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence. Article 19(6) was similarly broadened to allow restrictions on the freedom to practise any profession or carry on any trade or business in the interests of the general public.
The amendment was triggered partly by Supreme Court decisions in 1950-51 — particularly Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras (1950) and Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi (1950) — which had struck down public-order restrictions on speech as not falling within the original "reasonable restrictions" grounds. The 1st Amendment widened the grounds to include "public order," resolving the issue.
Article 15(4) added. The 1st Amendment added clause (4) to Article 15, allowing the State to make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes or for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This was a response to State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951), in which the Supreme Court had struck down communal reservation in educational institutions as violating Article 15. Article 15(4) provided a constitutional basis for such reservations.
Articles 85 and 87 modified. Article 85 (sessions of Parliament) was changed to require not more than six months between sessions, instead of two sessions per year. Article 87 (President's address) was changed to require Presidential address only at the commencement of the first session each year, rather than at every session.
Legacy — and the Coelho boundary
The 1st Amendment's legacy is contested. On one reading, it was the first step in a sustained effort by Parliament to insulate social-reform legislation from judicial review — a pattern that would continue through the 4th Amendment (1955), the 17th Amendment (1964), the 25th Amendment (1971), and beyond. The Ninth Schedule grew from 13 entries in 1951 to over 280 entries today, with each new amendment adding more laws to the immunity zone.
On another reading, the 1st Amendment was a necessary correction. The Constituent Assembly had not anticipated the scale of land reform that would be needed in independent India. The original Article 31, with its strong compensation requirement, would have made comprehensive land reform impossibly slow and expensive. The 1st Amendment's carve-outs allowed land reform to proceed.
The Supreme Court's response over the decades has been incremental. Shankari Prasad (1951) upheld the 1st Amendment. Sajjan Singh (1965) upheld the 17th Amendment. Golak Nath (1967) reversed direction, holding that Fundamental Rights could not be amended. Kesavananda Bharati (1973) reversed Golak Nath but introduced the basic-structure limit. Minerva Mills (1980) struck down the 42nd Amendment's expansion of Article 31C. I.R. Coelho (2007) brought the basic-structure limit to bear on the Ninth Schedule itself.
The 1st Amendment thus stands at the head of a long doctrinal evolution. Its specific provisions — Articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule — remain part of the Constitution. But the immunity they provide is no longer absolute. After Coelho, post-1973 Ninth Schedule entries can be challenged on basic-structure grounds. The 1st Amendment's scheme survives, but with the gloss that the basic structure cannot be amended away.
What students must hold
One subtle point about the institutional history worth holding. The 1st Amendment was enacted by the provisional Parliament — that is, the Constituent Assembly continuing in legislative capacity until elections to the new Parliament were held in 1951–52. So the same body that had drafted and adopted the Constitution in 1949 was the body that first amended it in 1951. This continuity raised a question about constitutional propriety: was it appropriate for the framers themselves to amend the document so soon after enacting it? The objection was raised in debate but did not derail the amendment. The provisional Parliament was, by Article 379 of the original Constitution (since repealed), invested with full legislative authority including the amending power.
A related point on the Coelho boundary. The 9-judge bench in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) drew the line at 24 April 1973 specifically because that was the date of the Kesavananda judgment. The reasoning was that since the basic-structure doctrine was laid down on that date, anything done before could not be tested against it (the Court could not retrospectively apply a doctrine that did not yet exist). But anything done after — including additions to the Ninth Schedule — must be tested. The Court did not decide individual challenges to specific Ninth Schedule entries; it laid down the test for future challenges. Several entries have since been examined under this test in subsequent litigation.
The 1st Amendment also marked the beginning of an enduring constitutional pattern: the use of the amendment power to insulate categories of legislation from judicial review. Successive amendments — 4th (1955), 17th (1964), 25th (1971), 29th (1972), 34th (1974), 39th (1975), 40th (1976), 47th (1984), and others — have added laws to the Ninth Schedule. The Schedule has become not just a protective list for land reform but a general mechanism for shielding controversial legislation. The Coelho boundary now provides the limit, but the pattern of using the amendment power for legislative shielding traces directly back to the 1st Amendment.
Five points carry the weight. One, the 1st Amendment was passed in June 1951 by the provisional Parliament (Constituent Assembly continuing in that capacity). It was the first amendment to the Constitution.
Two, the 1st Amendment introduced Articles 31A, 31B, and the Ninth Schedule. Article 31A protected land-reform laws of a specific kind; Article 31B protected laws listed in the new Ninth Schedule from challenge on any Fundamental Rights ground.
Three, the 1st Amendment also added Article 15(4) (special provisions for backward classes) and modified Article 19(2) and 19(6) (broader grounds for reasonable restrictions, including public order).
Four, Parliament can place laws in the Ninth Schedule (2018 PYQ statement 1 correct), but after I.R. Coelho (2007), post-1973 entries can be reviewed on basic-structure grounds (statement 2 wrong).
Five, the 2023 PYQ — the 1st Amendment was widely believed to be enacted to overcome judicial interpretations of Fundamental Rights, particularly Kameshwar Singh (1951) on land reform. For the broader story of judicial review and amending power, see basic structure doctrine. For other landmark amendments, see 42nd Amendment and 44th Amendment.