The 42nd Amendment of 1976 introduced two new constitutional articles — Article 323A and Article 323B — empowering Parliament and State Legislatures to establish tribunals as quasi-judicial adjudicatory bodies. The architecture was meant to relieve the High Courts of mounting service-related litigation and to provide specialised forums for technical matters. The original design excluded High Court writ jurisdiction over tribunal decisions. The Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) struck down this exclusion as violating the basic structure — judicial review under Articles 226/227 and Article 32 cannot be ousted. Today tribunals operate as courts of first instance subject to High Court scrutiny. Hold the architecture, the case-law evolution, and the operational framework.
Origin — the 42nd Amendment
Articles 323A and 323B were inserted into the Constitution by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act 1976, which came into force from 1 February 1977. The Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to the amendment Bill stated:
"To reduce the mounting arrears in High Courts and to secure the speedy disposal of service matters, revenue matters and certain other matters of special importance in the context of the socio-economic development and progress, it is considered expedient to provide for administrative and other tribunals for dealing with such matters while preserving the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in regard to such matters under Article 136 of the Constitution."
The framers of the 42nd Amendment had three objectives:
One — reduce High Court arrears. Service matters constituted a substantial portion of High Court writ litigation. Tribunalisation would shift this burden to specialised forums.
Two — speedy disposal. Specialised tribunals could decide cases faster than High Courts, where service cases competed with constitutional and other matters.
Three — technical expertise. Tribunals could be staffed with members having domain expertise — service law, taxation, industrial relations — providing more informed decisions than generalist judges.
Two articles were inserted because the framers wanted distinct architectures for two categories.
Article 323A — Administrative Tribunals. For service matters of public servants. Only Parliament can legislate. The architecture is uniform across India.
Article 323B — Other Tribunals. For other specified matters (taxation, industrial disputes, land reforms, etc.). Both Parliament and State Legislatures can legislate. The architecture can be diverse.
The 42nd Amendment's tribunalisation was part of the broader emergency-era constitutional restructuring. Other amendments curbed judicial review, expanded Parliament's powers, and altered the federal balance. Tribunalisation fit this pattern — moving adjudication out of the regular courts into bodies more amenable to executive control.
Article 323A — service tribunals
Article 323A empowers Parliament to establish administrative tribunals for adjudication of service matters. The article reads:
"(1) Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government."
Article 323A(2) specifies what such a law may provide:
(a) Establishment of an administrative tribunal for the Union, and a separate administrative tribunal for each State, or for two or more States.
(b) Specifying the jurisdiction, powers, and procedure of the tribunals.
(c) Provisions about appointment of members and the tribunal's composition.
(d) Originally — exclusion of all courts (except the Supreme Court under Article 136) from the jurisdiction of these tribunals. This clause was struck down by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (1997).
(e) Transfer of pending cases from existing courts to tribunals.
(f) Repeal of laws contrary to the new framework.
(g) Other supplementary provisions.
Article 323A(3) — these provisions have effect notwithstanding anything in any other constitutional or legal provision.
Implementation — Administrative Tribunals Act 1985.
Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 in pursuance of Article 323A. The Act establishes:
Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) — for service disputes of Central Government employees, employees of certain corporations and authorities. Headquartered in New Delhi with several Benches across India.
State Administrative Tribunals (SATs) — for service disputes of State Government employees. Established by the Centre on the request of the State Government.
Composition typically: Chairperson + Vice-Chairperson + Members. Half are Judicial Members (former High Court judges); half are Administrative Members (former senior civil servants).
Jurisdiction: All-India Services personnel, Central Government employees, and (for SATs) State Government employees. Service matters: appointment, conditions of service, dismissal, promotion, transfer, pension, retirement.
Article 323B — wider tribunals
Article 323B has a wider scope than Article 323A. It enables both Parliament and State Legislatures to establish tribunals for adjudication of disputes in specified subject areas.
Article 323B(1) empowers the appropriate Legislature (Parliament for Union matters; State Legislatures for State matters; subject to Schedule VII distribution) to provide by law for adjudication or trial by tribunals of any disputes, complaints, or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in Article 323B(2).
Article 323B(2) — list of matters for which tribunals can be established:
(a) Levy, assessment, collection, and enforcement of any tax.
(b) Foreign exchange, import and export across customs frontiers.
(c) Industrial and labour disputes.
(d) Land reforms by way of acquisition by the State of any estate as defined in Article 31A.
(e) Ceiling on urban property.
(f) Elections to Parliament or State Legislatures (except matters under Articles 329 and 329A).
(g) Production, procurement, supply, and distribution of foodstuffs (including edible oilseeds and oils) and such other goods as the President may specify by public notification.
(h) Rent, regulation of tenancy issues including the right, title, and interest of landlords and tenants.
(i) Offences against laws with respect to any of the above matters and fees in respect of any of those matters.
(j) Any matter incidental to any of the above matters.
Article 323B(3) — the law establishing tribunals may:
(a) Provide for a hierarchy of tribunals.
(b) Specify their jurisdiction, powers, and procedure.
(c) Lay down their procedure.
(d) Originally — exclude jurisdiction of all courts (except the Supreme Court under Article 136). Struck down in L. Chandra Kumar.
(e) Transfer pending cases.
(f) Other supplementary matters.
Article 323B(4) — these provisions have effect notwithstanding anything in any other constitutional or legal provision.
Article 323B has been used by Parliament to establish tribunals like:
National Green Tribunal (NGT) — under National Green Tribunal Act 2010 — for environmental matters.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) — for income tax disputes (predates Article 323B but operates under similar architecture).
Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT).
Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) — for SEBI orders.
Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT).
Various State-level tribunals for rent control, land reforms, etc.
S.P. Sampath Kumar — initial validation
The constitutional validity of Article 323A and the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 was first tested in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987).
Facts. The Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 originally provided for exclusive tribunal jurisdiction over service matters — the High Courts' writ jurisdiction was ousted; only the Supreme Court's Article 136 jurisdiction remained.
Challenge. The petitioners argued that exclusion of High Court jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 violated the basic structure of the Constitution — judicial review and federalism.
Holding. A Constitution Bench upheld the Tribunals architecture, but with significant modifications:
(i) The Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32 must be preserved. The original Act had excluded Article 32 — the Court directed Parliament to amend the Act to restore Article 32 jurisdiction.
(ii) Tribunals must be staffed with judicial members (typically former High Court judges) to ensure they function as effective substitutes for the High Courts.
(iii) The exclusion of High Court jurisdiction was upheld, on the basis that tribunals were "effective substitutes" for the High Courts in service matters.
Aftermath. Parliament amended the Administrative Tribunals Act to restore Article 32 jurisdiction. The Sampath Kumar framework operated for a decade.
However, doubts persisted. Tribunal decisions were generating their own jurisprudence; appeals to the Supreme Court under Article 136 were rare due to cost and procedural barriers. The "effective substitute" theory was tested in practice and found wanting — tribunals could not match the High Courts' constitutional role as guardians of fundamental rights and reviewers of executive action.
The basic structure question remained: is the High Court's writ jurisdiction itself part of the basic structure? Sampath Kumar had not addressed this directly. The Court would revisit this question in L. Chandra Kumar a decade later.
L. Chandra Kumar — basic structure ruling
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) is the landmark seven-judge bench ruling that fundamentally restructured the tribunal architecture.
Question. Whether Clause 2(d) of Article 323A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323B (which authorised exclusion of High Court writ jurisdiction over tribunal decisions) violated the basic structure of the Constitution?
Holding. The seven-judge bench held:
(i) Judicial review under Articles 226/227 (High Courts) and Article 32 (Supreme Court) is part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution. This jurisdiction cannot be excluded — even by a constitutional amendment.
(ii) Article 323A clause 2(d) and Article 323B clause 3(d) — to the extent they authorise exclusion of High Court jurisdiction — are unconstitutional.
(iii) Tribunals function as courts of first instance. Their decisions are subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the tribunal falls. Direct appeals from tribunals to the Supreme Court under Article 136 are no longer the only route — aggrieved parties can move the High Court first.
(iv) Tribunals can examine the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules — except the constitutional validity of their own parent Act. They cannot strike down a constitutional provision but can decide constitutional issues arising in their cases.
(v) The "effective substitute" theory of Sampath Kumar was rejected. Tribunals are NOT substitutes for High Courts — they are first-instance forums supplemented by High Court supervision.
Reasoning. The Court emphasised that:
(a) The Constitution's scheme treats the Supreme Court and High Courts as the constitutional courts. Their writ jurisdiction is an essential feature.
(b) Without High Court supervision, tribunals could be subjected to executive influence — undermining the rule of law.
(c) Article 142 (basic structure cases) — the framers could not have intended that even constitutional amendments could oust judicial review by High Courts and the Supreme Court.
(d) The Supreme Court alone, through Article 136, cannot effectively supervise the thousands of tribunal decisions — High Courts are needed as intermediate fora.
Aftermath. The judgment substantially restructured tribunal practice. Aggrieved parties now move the High Court (not the Supreme Court directly) against tribunal decisions. The High Courts under Articles 226/227 review tribunal decisions on procedural and substantive grounds. The Supreme Court's Article 136 jurisdiction continues but is exercised after the High Court has examined the matter.
Tribunals today — framework and challenges
The tribunal architecture today operates under the post-L. Chandra Kumar framework. Tribunals function as first-instance forums; High Courts review their decisions; the Supreme Court is the apex.
Major tribunals operating in India:
Service: Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), State Administrative Tribunals.
Tax: Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT).
Environment: National Green Tribunal (NGT).
Securities and Markets: Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT).
Companies: National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).
Telecom: Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT).
Armed Forces: Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT).
Industrial Relations: Industrial Tribunals, Labour Courts.
Various others — Railway Claims Tribunal, Motor Accident Claims Tribunals, Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums (which are quasi-tribunals), etc.
Tribunalisation Reform Act 2017 and 2021 amendments. The Government attempted to consolidate and rationalise the tribunal structure through Acts in 2017 and 2021. These Acts merged some tribunals, transferred some appeals to High Courts, and modified composition rules. The Supreme Court in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021) struck down some provisions of these Acts as violating the principle of judicial independence.
Operational challenges.
(i) Vacancy issues. Many tribunals have substantial vacancies. The selection process for tribunal members is often slow.
(ii) Independence. Tribunal members' appointment, tenure, and conditions of service have raised concerns about independence from the executive that establishes the tribunal.
(iii) Backlog. Some tribunals have accumulated significant pendency despite the original goal of reducing High Court arrears.
(iv) Layered review. Adding a tribunal layer plus High Court review plus Supreme Court appeal can effectively add to the litigation burden rather than reduce it.
The basic constitutional architecture under Articles 323A and 323B remains. The post-L. Chandra Kumar framework has been operationally accepted. The tribunalisation experiment continues to evolve.
What students must hold
Six points carry the weight. One, Articles 323A and 323B added by 42nd Amendment 1976. Article 323A — only Parliament can legislate; service tribunals for public servants. Article 323B — both Parliament and State Legislatures can legislate; wider categories.
Two, Article 323B subjects: taxation, foreign exchange, industrial and labour disputes, land reforms, ceiling on urban property, elections, foodstuffs, rent regulation, offences against these laws, incidental matters.
Three, original Articles 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d) — exclusion of all courts except SC under Article 136. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997, seven-judge bench) STRUCK DOWN these clauses as violating basic structure.
Four, L. Chandra Kumar ruling: (i) Judicial review under Articles 226/227 (High Courts) and Article 32 (Supreme Court) is BASIC STRUCTURE. (ii) Tribunals are courts of first instance, subject to High Court Division Bench scrutiny. (iii) Tribunals can examine constitutional validity of statutes (but not their own parent Act). (iv) Earlier Sampath Kumar "effective substitute" theory rejected.
Five, implementation: Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 — CAT (Central) and State Administrative Tribunals. NGT under National Green Tribunal Act 2010. Various other tribunals — ITAT, CESTAT, SAT, NCLT, NCLAT, TDSAT, AFT, etc.
Six, post-L. Chandra Kumar route: Tribunal → Division Bench of High Court (Articles 226/227) → Supreme Court (Article 136). Direct appeal from tribunal to Supreme Court no longer the only route. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021) struck down provisions of 2017 and 2021 tribunal reform Acts. For more, see judicial review and 42nd Amendment.